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parties, then the doctrine of res judicata should be applicable to prevent this vicious circle of uncertainty.
G. William Fowler

TORTS--TRADE SECRETS-AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY Is AN IMPROPER
MEANS OF ACQUIRING

A

TRADE SECRET WHEN COUNTERVAILING DE-

FENSES ARE NOT REASONABLY AVAILABLE To THE OWNER OF THE
TRADE SECRET AND TRADE SECRETS MAY BE PROPERLY DISCOVERED
ONLY BY REVERSE ENGINEERING,

INDEPENDENT RESEARCH OR IF THE

OWNER VOLUNTARILY REVEALS THE SECRET. E. I. du Pont de Nemours

& Co., Inc. v. Christopher,431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).

Defendants, commercial photographers, were hired by an undisclosed third party to take aerial photographs of new construction at
plaintiff's plant. Plaintiff contended that it had developed a highly
secret but unpatented process for producing methanol, a process which
gave it a competitive advantage over other producers. Plaintiff alleged
that this process was a trade secret which it had taken special precautions to safeguard. While the plant was under construction, parts of
the process were exposed to an aerial view of the construction area.
Plaintiff contended that unknown parties engaged the defendants to
take aerial photographs of the area that would enable a skilled person
to deduce the secret process for making methanol. Defendants argued
that they had committed no actionable wrong in photographing plaintiff's facility because an appropriation of a trade secret in Texas was
not wrongful unless a breach of confidence or fraudulent or illegal
conduct was involved. The trial court denied defendant's motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim and also denied their motion for a
summary judgment. The court then granted defendant's motion for
an interlocutory appeal' to allow them to obtain immediate appellate
review of the court's finding that plaintiff had stated a claim upon
which relief could be granted. Held-Affirmed. Aerial photography is
an improper means of acquiring a trade secret when countervailing
defenses are not reasonably available to the owner of the trade secret
and trade secrets may be properly discovered only by reverse engineering, independent research or if the owner voluntarily reveals the secret.
Trade secrets are not protected by statute as are patents and copyrights2 because they do not possess all the normal attributes of a prop128 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964).
2 1 H. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKs, § 142 at 406 (4th
ed. 1947).
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erty right.8 They may be used by anyone who discovers them by fair5
means. 4 Early English cases spoke of trade secrets as a type of property
and recognized them as a protectable interest. These cases formed a
basis for the debate in the United States Supreme Court involving
property aspects of trade secrets. 7 The American viewpoint came into
focus when Justice Holmes declared:
The word property as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is
an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the
primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements
of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or
not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through a
special confidence that he accepted. The property may be denied
but the confidence cannot be.8
Thus Justice Holmes established the basis of trade secret protection
as being related to "rudimentary requirements of good faith" in the
business world relegating the "property" aspect to secondary importance. The acquisition method showing a lack of good faith-a breach
of confidence-was the basis of a cause of action and not any inherent
property right in the trade secret.
Later decisions have continued to use Justice Holmes' rationale. In
Smith v. Dravo Corporation, the court held that the question to be
decided was not how could a trade secret be obtained but on the contrary the question was how did the defendant learn of it. ° The Supreme
Court of Texas in K & G Tool & Service Company v. G & G Fishing
Tool Service adopted the test set out in Smith v. Dravo holding that it
correctly represented "the prevailing American rule upon the ques"10 Thus Texas ruled in accord with the American majority
tion ..
8 E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102, 37 S. Ct. 575,
576, 61 L. Ed. 1016, 1019 (1917).
§ 142 at 407 (4th
4 1 H. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKs,
ed. 1947).
5 Exchange Telegraph Co. v. Gregory & Co., [1896] 1 Q.B. 147 (1895).
OPollard v. Photographic Co., [1889] 40 Ch. 345, 354 (1888).
7 E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102, 37 S. Ct. 575,
576, 61 L. Ed. 1016, 1019 (1917). But see International News Service v. Associated Press,
248 U.S. 215, 240, 39 S. Ct. 68, 73, 63 L. Ed. 211, 221 (1918).
8 E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102, 37 S. Ct. 575,
576, 61 L. Ed. 1016, 1019 (1917). An anonymous note on Equitable Protection of Trade
Secrets, 23 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 164 (1923), completely rejected the property fiction
used by the courts. The author stated therein that the protection of trade secrets had to
be viewed in its true light as . . . a conflict between the policy of giving free rein to
the individual in his efforts to support himself and the policy of encouraging business
enterprise by protecting trade secrets." (Emphasis added.) The author recognized the
fact that if competitors were given "free rein" in the methods employed to discover trade
secrets, the impetus to independently develop new products and processes would be
destroyed.
9203 F.2d 369, 374 (7th Cir. 1953).
10 158 Tex. 594, 602, 314 S.W.2d 782, 787 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898, 79 S. Ct.
223, 3 L. Ed.2d 149 (1958).
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holding that the method of trade secret acquisition is determinative
of a defendant's liability to the owner of that trade secret."
The method of acquisition used in the instant case, aerial photog2
raphy, presents a case of first impression in Texas.1
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant's
contention that an appropriation of trade secrets is not wrongful where
there is no breach of confidence or fraudulent or illegal conduct involved.' 3 Basing its holding on the Supreme Court of Texas' ruling in
Hyde Corporation v. Huffines-4 the court declared that in Texas
". there is a cause of action for the discovery of a trade secret by any
'improper means.'"15 The Court in Hyde adopted the language of the
Restatement that:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secrets, without a privilege to do so, is liable to the other if:
(a) he discovers the secret by improper means, or
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed
in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him .... 16
The defendants in the instant case contended that Furr's Incorporated v. United Specialty Advertising Company limited trade secret
protection in Texas to a breach of confidence. 17 To uphold this contention the court would have had to ignore the fact that both subsection (a) and subsection (b) of section 757 of the Restatement were
adopted by the Supreme Court of Texas in Hyde. The court refused
to so hold stating that such a ruling would not be in keeping with the
"11

H. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS, § 148 at 419 (4th

ed. 1947).
12 E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1013 (5th
Cir. 1970). In describing the method used, the court at page I stated: "This is a case of
industrial espionage in which an airplane is the cloak and a camera the dagger."
13 Id. Breaches of confidence have been the most common complaint in regard to
wrongful acquisition of trade secrets. See Annot., 170 A.L.R. 449, 475 (1947). For more
recent cases see Speedry Chemical Products, Inc. v. Carter's Ink Co., 306 F.2d 328 (2d
Cir. 1962); Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline and Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912 (7th Cir.
1953); Allen-Qualley Co. v. Shellmar Products Co., 31 F.2d 293 (N.D. I1. 1929). Fraud
and thievery have also been used to acquire trade secrets, see A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1934); Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co. of
America, 24 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1928); Yovatt v. Winyard, 37 Eng. Rep. 425 (Ch. 1820).
14 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d 763 (1958).
15E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th
Cir. 1970).
16 Restatement of Torts, § 757 at 1 (1939) at 158 Tex. 566, 575, 314 S.W.2d 763, 769
(1958).
17 338 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1960), later case on new evidence 385
S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 824, 86 S. Ct. 59, 15 L.
Ed.2d 71 (1965). The Christophers' contention was based on the statement in Furr's
that: "The use of someone else's idea is not automatically a violation of the law. It must
be something that meets the requirements of a 'trade secret' and has been obtained
through a breach of confidence in order to entitle the injured party to damages and/or
injunction." 338 S.W.2d at 766.
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".... traditional precision of the Restatement... ." and that subsection
(a) had been adopted and could not be ignored.'8
The court then proceeded to hold that it was proper to discover a
competitor's trade secret by reverse engineering applied to the finished
product or by independent research, but "To obtain knowledge of a
process without spending the time and money to discover it independently is improper unless the holder voluntarily discloses it or fails to
take reasonable precautions to ensure its secrecy."' 19 Whether the precautionary measures are reasonable is a question of fact.20 The court
ruled that Du Pont had taken reasonable precautions to protect the
secrecy of its plant and the court would not ".... require the discoverer
of a trade secret to guard against the unanticipated, the undetectable,
or the unpreventable methods of espionage now available"-aerial
photography. 21 The fact that the undisclosed third party hired the
defendants to take the photographs of the secret process precluded the
use of the argument that they were going to obtain the process by their
own independent research.
The adoption of the Restatement as to the proper methods of trade
secret acquisition is a step in the right direction protecting both the
inventive and competitive segments of our industrial society. Such protection is ". . . a part of the original jurisdiction of chancery, independently of any rights which the injured party may have at law." 22 Thus
courts of equity will protect the inventive segment of industry by preventing unscrupulous industrial espionage while allowing the competitive segment legitimate information in areas where reasonable
precautions have not been taken to avoid discovery by intrusive eyes.
I1 E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th
Cir. 1970). In explaining the meaning of "improper" in subsection (a) the court referred
to the comment of the authors of the Restatement on that subsection: "f. Improper
means of discovery. The discovery of another's trade secret by improper means subjects
the actor to liability independently of the harm to the interest in the secret. Thus, if
one uses physical force to take a secret formula from another's pocket, or breaks into
another's office to steal the formula, his conduct is wrongful and subjects him to liability
apart from the rule stated in this Section. Such conduct is also an improper means of
procuring the secret under this rule. But means may be improper under this rule even
though they do not cause any other harm than that to the interest in the trade secret.
Examples of such means are fraudulent misrepresentations to induce disclosure, tapping
telephone wires, eavesdropping or other espionage. A complete catalogue of improper
means is not possible. In general they are means which fall below the generally accepted
standards of commercial morality and reasonable conduct." Restatement of Torts § 757,
comment (f) at 10 (1939).
19 Id. at 1015.
20 Allen Manufacturing Co. v. Loika, 144 A.2d 306, 310 (Conn. 1958).
21 E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th
Cir. 1970). The court in the instant case did not specify the "reasonable precautions" that
were taken by Du Pont. Since the secret process could only be seen from the air the
precautions employed by Du Pont probably consisted of fences or similar barriers erected
around the construction area.
22 1 H. NiMs, THE LAw OF UNFAIR CoMPETrrION AND TRADE MARKS, § 141 at 405 (4th
ed. 1947).
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